Mission Failure: Civilian Review of Policing in New York City — Summary of Findings

Mission Failure: Civilian Review of Policing in New York City — Summary of Findings

• The CCRB is failing to fulfill its mission as mandated in the City Charter. The New York City Charter mandates that the CCRB undertake “complete, thorough and impartial” investigations of police-misconduct complaints brought by civilians, and that these investigations are conducted in a manner in which both the public and the police have confidence.12 The CCRB fails to meet this standard. The agency investigates fewer than half of all complaints that it reviews, and it produces a finding on the merits in only three of ten complaints disposed of in any given year. The agency has failed to win the confidence of the city’s residents; the police department is largely dismissive of CCRB findings and recommendations.
• The CCRB has been unable to establish an effective investigative operation. The CCRB has historically closed about 50 percent of police-misconduct complaints without initiating an investigation; between 2002 and 2005 the “truncation” rate increased to 55 percent. In 2006 the CCRB closed 60 percent of all complaints without undertaking an investigation. The CCRB has conducted a full investigation in fewer than half of the complaints it has reviewed and disposed of. In 2002-2005 the CCRB closed only 42 percent of complaints with a full investigation. Of complaints fully investigated by the CCRB, the agency has disposed of approximately one-third as unsubstantiated — or inconclusive. The CCRB has substantiated, on average, 5.2 percent of complaints closed — far below the substantiation rates reported by civilian oversight agencies nationally.
• The CCRB has failed to advocate effectively for reform of police practices that pose a risk to public safety. The CCRB has done little to identify patterns of police misconduct and to recommend reforms in police practices that pose an undue risk of harm to civilians. The CCRB has failed to address effectively patterns of police misconduct related to racial profiling, the execution of “no-knock” warrants, and the policing of lawful public demonstrations. Even when the CCRB has documented a pattern of misconduct, and recommended reforms, the agency has often been silent when the department failed to act on the recommendations.
• Civilian complaints of police misconduct have been rising sharply. Complaints filed with the CCRB have increased 65 percent between 2000 and 2005 — from 4,251 complaints in 2000, to 6,796 filed in 2005. In 2006 civilians filed 7,669 complaints with the CCRB — an increase of 13 percent relative to the number filed in the preceding year. The number of allegations made in CCRB complaints has increased by more than 100 percent between 2000 and 2005 — from 9,387 allegations made in 2000, to 19,041 in 2005. (A complainant may allege that a police officer or police officers engaged in more than one act of misconduct.)
• CCRB complaint data indicate that the more serious forms of police misconduct occur with significant frequency. Half of all complaints filed with the CCRB include an allegation of excessive force. The ratio of force complaints to total complaints has been consistent since the independent CCRB was established. In 2006, however, the number of allegations of excessive force increased by 26.8 percent as compared with 2005 — nearly double the increase in complaints filed. The most frequently filed allegations involve serious abuse of authority — improper stop, frisk or search; unauthorized entry or search of premises; threat of arrest; threat of force — police actions that could provoke a confrontation between a police officer and a civilian.
• Complaints that accuse police officers of using excessive force rarely result in discipline. The CCRB substantiates approximately one-third as many force allegations as compared with non-force allegations. Of those police officers who face potential disciplinary action for the use of excessive force, relatively few are actually disciplined. Between 2000 and 2004 the NYPD closed about three times as many substantiated CCRB force cases without imposing discipline as compared with substantiated non-force cases.
• The NYPD condones acts of police misconduct by nullifying CCRB findings and recommendations. The department takes no disciplinary action against almost 30 percent of police officers named in substantiated CCRB complaints. Between 2000 and 2005 the NYPD disposed of substantiated complaints against 2,462 police officers: 725 received no discipline. When discipline was imposed, it was little more than a slap on the wrist. Of the 1,607 police officers who were disciplined in this time period, 534 received instructions regarding the misconduct. Another 717 police officers received command discipline — which at the discretion of the precinct commander may involve nothing more than a verbal admonishment. The most severe sanction imposed under command discipline is a loss of 10 vacation days. In recent years it appears that the NYPD has adopted a radically more lenient disciplinary standard as regards acts of police misconduct directed at civilians. In 2004 the police department ordered instructions in approximately 30 percent of all disciplinary actions related to a substantiated CCRB complaint. In 2005 instructions represented nearly 60 percent of such disciplinary actions; and in 2006 instructions rose to 72 percent of all disciplinary actions related to police misconduct directed at civilians. Suspension of a police officer has become an extraordinarily rare occurrence, even when egregious acts of misconduct are involved. Of the 1,076 police officers who were referred to an administrative trial to face charges between 1998 and 2004, approximately 63 percent received no discipline. (2004 is the last year for which complete data are available on disciplinary action taken by the NYPD, based on the year CCRB complaints were referred for discipline.) In most of those cases, the administrative trial judge dismissed the charges or found the police officer not guilty. During this time period, cases were dismissed against 198 police officers against whom the CCRB had substantiated misconduct complaints. In another 363 cases administrative judges issued non-guilty findings.
• The NYPD has co-opted the civilian oversight system. Commenting on the independent CCRB five years after it had been established, a leading scholar on policing stated, “the police are doing . . . their best to make [the CCRB] as ineffective as they can.” There is considerable evidence that indicates this assertion is still accurate. The police department has consistently and persistently withheld documents or delayed the production of documents needed by the CCRB to investigate police-misconduct complaints. This problem has been documented in reports published by the New York City Comptroller’s office in 1998 and 2002. The CCRB’s investigators report that the police department’s delay-and-deny tactics in response to records requests hobbles the operations of the oversight agency. Investigation of serious misconduct runs up against the eighteen-month statute of limitations, which results in the premature curtailment of CCRB investigations. Investigators also report that on any given day approximately half of all police officers scheduled for an interview at the CCRB — including witnesses and those named in a complaint — fail to appear, further compromising investigators’ ability to conduct timely investigations. The police department’s Internal Affairs Bureau conducts investigations of certain serious complaints (for example, complaints that include excessive-force allegations) concurrently with the CCRB. This practice further delays the production of documents that the CCRB requires to complete its investigations.
• The NYPD’s prosecution of substantiated CCRB cases fails to meet minimum standards of competence. The New York City Commission on Police Corruption has published comprehensive reports (in 2002 and 2004) on the Department Advocate’s Office (DAO), the NYPD unit that prosecutes officers who face administrative charges related to substantiated CCRB complaints. These reports find that the DAO conducts little if any case preparation. Complainants and witnesses are not contacted, and documentary evidence is not requested. Prosecutors’ trial skills, according to the Commission’s reports, fail to meet minimum standards of professionalism. The CCRB’s investigators state that the office of the Deputy Commissioner of Trials employs an improperly heightened standard of proof in adjudicating substantiated CCRB complaints. The New York City Commission to Combat Police Corruption has made the same observation in a published report. If the Deputy Commissioner of Trials requires a showing greater than a preponderance of the evidence to establish that misconduct has occurred, then the city’s civilian oversight system is fundamentally compromised.
• The CCRB demonstrates extraordinary deference to the police department. Agencies charged with providing oversight of policing face stiff resistance from law enforcement. Political officials are often silently complicit in this standoff. Faced with this political dynamic, the oversight agency’s board members and top administrators often defer to the police. This dynamic has undermined the civilian-review function in many United States cities, and this is the case in New York City as well. The CCRB has failed to analyze the police department’s frequent rejection of the oversight agency’s findings and disciplinary recommendations; nor has the agency analyzed or objected to the extraordinarily lenient disciplinary action taken by the department, even in cases that involve serious misconduct. The CCRB has failed in its reporting to address the fact that the NYPD rarely disciplines police officers for acts of excessive force: a police officer against whom the CCRB has substantiated a complaint involving excessive force is 70 percent less likely to receive discipline than a police officer with a substantiated complaint that does not involve force. In more than one instance the CCRB has documented a troubling pattern of misconduct allegations and forwarded a policy recommendation to the police commissioner — only to fall silent as the police commissioner blatantly disregards the agency’s recommendation. The agency has failed to address persistent police misconduct involving strip searches, stop-and-frisk activity, and police officers’ failure to identify themselves to civilians.
• The failure of the city’s civilian oversight system has had serious harmful consequences — for the victims of police misconduct and for law enforcement. The failure of the civilian oversight system has created grave risks to public safety and to individual liberty. In the name of law enforcement, police officers have inflicted serious physical, psychological and financial harm on many thousands of the city’s residents. The city’s failure to hold police officers accountable for acts of misconduct directed at civilians undermines confidence in law enforcement and discourages cooperation with criminal investigations. Without meaningful oversight there is no accountability. Police officers commit misconduct without facing discipline and without consequence for their employment status. The CCRB has failed to discover, or has ignored, patterns of police misconduct; and the NYPD has therefore failed to adopt reforms — in police training, tactics, policies and practices — that could prevent foreseeable risks of harm. New York City taxpayers also incur significant financial costs as a consequence of the failure to deter police misconduct. Between 2000 and 2004 the city has expended more than a quarter of a billion dollars to resolve lawsuits brought against police officers for egregious acts of misconduct. (Not included in this calculation are those lawsuits that are filed and litigated, but that do not result in a judgment or settlement.)
• The city has failed to establish meaningful accountability for police misconduct. City officials have been silent in the face of voluminous evidence that the civilian oversight system is failing. There has been an abdication of responsibility and effective leadership by the mayor, the police commissioner, the City Council and the appointed members of the CCRB. As a consequence the city is failing to comply with the City Charter’s mandate that the CCRB provide independent oversight and accountability for acts of police misconduct directed at civilians.